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One important benefit of the Guodian and Shanghai Museum strips is the new insights they are providing in our 
understanding of the early intellectual evolution of both Confucianism and Daoism. The emergence of “feelings” or 
“affectivity” (qing ᚙ) as a key Zisizi terminology, for example, requires not only a careful study of the newly 
acquired documents themselves, particularly the two versions of Xingzimingchu ᗻ㞾ੑߎ (Xingqing ᗻᚙ), but in 
fact a re-reading of all of the classical Confucian texts to reinstate this important sensibility. Now that we know 
more, we can better appreciate the central role of concrete family feeling as the very ground (nei ݙ) of classical 
Confucian moral philosophy.i 
 But there is a second important opportunity that the newly recovered documents provide. Beyond what is new in 
them, these same materials can be used to qualify, corroborate, and reiterate perhaps old but still undervalued 
insights into the interpretive context within which we construct our understanding of early China. One hugely 
important example is when the distinguished French sinologist Marcel Granet observes rather starkly that “Chinese 
wisdom has no need of the idea of God.”ii This characterization of classical Chinese philosophy has had many 
iterations albeit in different formulations, by many of our most prominent sinologists both Chinese and Western 
alike. Indeed, our best interpreters of classical Chinese philosophy are explicit in rejecting the idea that Chinese 
cosmology begins from some independent, transcendent principle and entails the metaphysical reality/appearance 
distinction and the plethora of dualistic categories that arise from such a worldview.iii  
The philosophical implications of this seemingly off-hand observation are fundamental and pervasive. One 
consequence of taking this insight into Chinese cosmology seriously is that it enables us to disambiguate some of 
the central philosophical vocabulary of classical Chinese philosophy by identifying equivocations that emerge when 
we elide classical Greek cosmological assumptions with those indigenous to the classical Chinese worldview. We 
will find that an important corollary to the absence of “God” in Chinese cosmology is the need for a different 
language in thinking about issues as basic as cosmic origins, the source of meaning in the world, and the nature of 
creativity itself. In fact, the recently recovered Guodian materials provide us with both the resources and the 
occasion to revisit three related cosmological issues: what is distinctive about classical Chinese cosmogony and its 
notion of origins, what is the Chinese alternative to the assumptions about our own familiar creatio ex nihilo source 
of meaning, and how is “creativity” expressed in the Chinese philosophical vocabulary?  
I want to pursue a second thesis in this essay. On the basis of the resolutely correlative and collateral assumptions 
that I will argue ground early Chinese cosmology, I want to suggest that early Confucianism and early Daoism are 
best “resurrected” by being understood in their relationship to one another. To illustrate this point, I will begin from 
the cosmology made explicit in the Guodian Daoist materials—a cosmology that I will suggest has immediate 
relevance for both early Daoism and Confucianism as a largely shared commonsense—and then try to demonstrate 
the relevance of this cosmology to Confucianism by locating the central Confucian notion of harmony (he ੠) 
within this prevailing worldview. 
Further, as important as the answers to these cosmological questions might be for clarifying the vocabulary of 
classical Chinese cosmology, Granet’s observation that there is no transcendentalism in the classical Chinese 
assumptions about cosmic order pays an even greater philosophical dividend. Beyond alerting us to the need for a 
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fundamentally different interpretive context as a precondition for taking the Chinese philosophical vocabulary on its 
own terms, this insight speaks to the more basic question of why Chinese philosophy might at this particular 
historical moment provide a salutary intervention in the Western philosophical narrative. That is, in this classical 
Chinese worldview there is a alternative nuanced and sophisticated processual way of thinking about cosmology that 
can respond at least in degree to the internal critique of transcendentalism that is taking place within the still 
Eurocentric discipline of philosophy itself. Simply put, with the present surge of interest in Whitehead and 
particularly the American pragmatists, this newly emerging Western version of process philosophy as it matures 
within our own philosophical culture can with profit draw sustenance from a tradition that has been doing a form of 
process philosophy since the beginning of its recorded history.  
To rehearse the recent breakthrough in our own philosophical tradition, in the wake of Darwin’s own great 
cultural revolution,iv John Dewey regarded an uncritical commitment to transcendentalism in any of its various 
forms to be one bit of faulty reasoning that has been so persistently exercised by the philosophical elite that he 
dubbed this particular deformation profesionelle  “the philosophical fallacy.” Simply put, the philosophical fallacy is 
committed whenever the outcome of a process is presumed to be antecedent to that process. Dewey from early on 
saw as “the most pervasive fallacy of philosophical thinking” the error of ignoring the historical, developmental, and 
contextualizing aspects of experience. The methodological problem as he saw it is “the abstracting of some one 
element from the organism which gives it meaning, and setting it up as absolute” and then proceeding to revere this 
one element “as the cause and ground of all reality and knowledge.”v  Such a problem arises in any and all of the 
many variations on the One-behind-the-many metaphysics—the many different names for “God.” Dewey’s point is 
that philosophers, empiricists and rationalists alike, have long been asking the ahistorical question: “Why I wonder 
were so many civil war battles fought in national parks?” Suffice to say that the philosophical fallacy is encountered 
anytime the terminus ad quem is placed before the terminus a quo. 
As on almost every other issue, of course, philosophers are likely to disagree as to precisely when the conditions 
leading to the commission of the philosophical fallacy obtain. A strong ontological disposition, sustained by a 
distinction between the orders of knowing and of being, will suggest that it is always appropriate to place “Being” 
before the beings of the world through which it is made manifest. The Thomist teleologist might find in some “far 
off Divine event” the ground as well as the goal of understanding, while the Millsean liberal will perhaps anticipate 
the perfectibility of the “ready-made” human being in the actualization of a given individuated potential.vi 
Of course, we philosophers are urged by the responsibilities of our office to warn against all fallacious forms of 
reasoning. But like the preacher who, come Monday morning, commits the very sins he railed against the day before, 
we are ourselves rarely delivered from the idols of the mind. Sometimes this fallacy is overlooked by polite 
conspiracy—as when we allow the author of a book to call the last pages to be written the “Preface,” or when we 
give the name “Presocratic philosophers” to those who in some seemingly necessary way anticipated the questions 
that would preoccupy the agara’s barefoot philosopher. In such cases, the fallacy seems both innocent and harmless. 
Moreover, given the extreme difficulty of avoiding this fallacious bit of reasoning, we may even find some 
justification in overlooking it, for, as William James says: “We live forward but we think backward.” And Jorge 
Luis Borges reinforces this wisdom when he remarks: “All life is anachronistic, and every man is born at the wrong 
time.” 
Still, one of the more pernicious of the many instances of the philosophical fallacy involves the kind of 
anachronism that reads history narrowly backwards from a given theoretical construct, finding at the origins of an 
historical narrative what in fact is merely one of the reflective fruits of that narrative. Such are the prejudices of 
teleological historiographies: Marxist, Hegelian, Christian, and indeed Scientific. This is not only one of the more 
damaging forms taken by this fallacy, it is also one of the most difficult to avoid. After all, if one is to achieve any 
coherence in the construction of an historical narrative, one must appeal to some pattern of meanings, where natural 
necessity can elevate that putative pattern to become the worthy object of systematic knowledge. 
In any event, what Dewey long ago termed the philosophical fallacy has indeed become the philosophical issue 
of our day. The internal critique continues to be waged against the philosophical fallacy within professional Western 
philosophy under the many banners of hermeneutics, post-modernism, neo-pragmatism, neo-Marxism, 
deconstructionism, post-modernism, feminist philosophy, and so on, that takes as a shared target what Robert 
Solomon has called “the transcendental pretense”—the philosophical fallacy expressed as idealism, objectivism, 
rationalism, materialism, volitionalism, teleology, empiricism, absolutism, logocentrism, the master narrative, the 
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myth of the given—so many of the familiar reductionistic “isms” that have been the putatively novel choices in 
switching horses on the merry-go-round of systematic philosophy. 
 
When we ask what is at risk in perpetuating the philosophical fallacy, there is much more at stake than the misinterpretation 
of the classical Chinese philosophical tradition. Threatened is the notion of process itself—development, education, creativity, 
particularity, temporality, history—what Henry Rosemont would call “the real hopes, fears, joys, sorrows, ideas, and attitudes of 
flesh-and-blood human beings.”vii For Darwin, Dewey, and for Rosemont too, the human being is a social achievement, an 
adaptive success made possible through the applications of social intelligence. Given the reality of change, this success is always 
provisional, leaving us as incomplete creatures with the always new challenge of contingent circumstances. And yet this success 
is progressive and programmatic. “We use our past experiences to construct new and better ones in the future.”viii The danger 
recognized by both Dewey and Rosemont is that the selection and privileging of one factor out of many to rationalize the human 
experience is usually not innocent. In fact, it is often the concealed weapon of some form of intellectual, political, or religious 
hegemony attempting to exercise its superiority over other possible claims. 
The crux of this rather lengthy preamble is that in spite of a conscious awareness of the inappropriateness of insinuating 
“God” into our understanding of ancient Chinese philosophy, we still willy-nilly proceed to do just that. Given the entrenched 
status of the philosophical fallacy in our own cosmology and the absence of any clear articulated alternative to it, we quickly lose 
sight of what is distinctive about classical Chinese cosmology and its sense of “origins,” and revert to old ways of thinking. Said 
another way, this transcendentalism—the appeal to some ultimate, independent, self-contained, absolute source—has not only 
been influential as a cultural dominant in the way in which we are inclined to think about our own origins, but has quite naturally 
colored our best readings of those cultural traditions that we would interpret, including classical China. Particularly, with the 
responsibility of interpreting Daoist notions of cosmogony for the Western academy, if we fail to make it clear that we are not 
ascribing a metaphysical creatio ex nihilo understanding of cosmogony to this tradition by providing guidance to some 
alternative reading, I expect that many if not most of our students and readers will tacitly default to this understanding.  
How can reflecting on the newly excavated texts in such a way as to reinstate the process sensibility assist in clarifying 
Chinese cosmology? In the 1993 Guodian find, a partial Laozi in 71 strips was found in three distinct bundles. The document that 
has been titled Taiyi shengshui໾ϔ⫳∈—The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters—from its opening phrase comprises 14 
of these strips. Physically, in the length of the bamboo strips, in the cord markings, in general appearance, and in calligraphic 
style, these strips are indistinguishable from the other strips in the Laozi C bundle. Although these strips have been treated as a 
separate document by the editors initially responsible for the reconstruction of the Guodian texts, this has been done solely on the 
basis of content, using the extant Daodejing as a principle of exclusion. These same scholars allow that, as a material artifact, it is 
an integral part of Laozi C. 
 
We can ask, then, what is the relationship between The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters and Laozi C? It 
is particularly interesting that this document in the present sequencing of the seven units that constitute Laozi C 
follows immediately on a version of the second half of chapter 64 that contains the phrase:  

ᰃҹ೷Ҏ……㛑䕙ϛѨП㞾✊㗠ᓫᬶЎ 
Although the sages... are quite capable of helping things follow their own course, they would not presume to do so. 
 
This phrase allows that in Daoist cosmology, even though the wisest and most accomplished human beings are 
able to assist in the way in which the myriad of events unfold, they would not think of interfering with the 
spontaneous emergence of things.  
First, as D.C. Lau has pointed out, a familiar signal of textual coherence in the classical corpus is the repetition of 
characters. In fact, we can link up all of the seven units of Laozi C by appealing to this method of character 
association. In particular, the character fu 䕙 (“to help”) that appears in the chapter 64 phrase cited above occurs 
eight times in the opening paragraph of The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters. 
Further, this second half of chapter 64 is significant as the only piece of text that appears twice in the recovered 
Guodian Daodejing, once in bundle A and again in bundle C. The two versions of this portion of chapter 64 are 
markedly different, and in fact, one key point of divergence is that the phrase describing the reticence of the sages to 
override cosmic spontaneity cited above appears in the Laozi A as: 
 
ᰃҹ೷Ҏ……㛑䕙ϛѨП㞾✊㗠ᓫ㛑Ў 
Although the sages are quite capable of helping things follow their own course, they are not able to do so. 
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This version of the text is problematic, and most commentators take it to be obviously corrupt. The idea found in 
the Laozi C version that the sages would not presume to interfere in the natural processes (fuganwei ᓫᬶЎ) is more 
consistent with the general tenor of the Daodejing than the unprecedented claim that they are unable to do so 
(funengwei ᓫ㛑Ў). We can speculate then that if The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters is not an integral 
part of the Daodejing at this point in its evolution, it is at the very least an explanatory commentary on a revised and 
improved version of chapter 64.  
Sarah Allan has recently completed and published a summary interpretive article of researches into The Ancestral 
One Gives Birth to the Waters that and brings together and evaluates the best historical and textual commentary of 
both Chinese and Western scholars, and that offers many of her own original insights into how we should read this 
difficult fragment.ix  One intriguing suggestion that Allan takes up once again in this essay is that the “focal 
meaning” and “root metaphor” of dao is waterway rather than roadway, with roadways being a more derivative 
meaning. There is much indeed to be found in her article.  
My small contribution here is to take a synoptic look at how The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters enables 
us to understand Daoist cosmogony broadly, and to try to make explicit what this cosmogony is, and what it is not. I 
will focus on the centrality of particularity, temporality, collateral relationality, and productive indeterminacy as 
persistent defining features of Daoist cosmology. I will argue that by taking these features seriously, we will be able 
to avoid a common equivocation between “One” in the familiar sense of God, and the “One that is both one and 
many” that is dao.  
We can fairly say that The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters is now the earliest record of Chinese 
cosmogony that we have. It not only sheds important light on other brief and suggestive cosmogonic allusions that 
we find in the received Daodejing (especially chapters 25, 39, 42, 51, and 52), but at least in part resonates rather 
explicitly with the language of these same chapters.  
In The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters, the Ancestral One ໾ϔ is identified as the first among the 
defining terms in the Daoist cosmology, and many if not most commentators follow the Lushi chunqiu in taking it to 
be a euphemism for dao: x  the unsummed totality of emerging experience, including the limitless and as yet 
indeterminate possibilities entailed by it. In this cosmology, the Ancestral One is followed by the heavens and the 
earth, the spiritual and the numinous, the yin and the yang qi, the four seasons, the hot and the cold, the wet and the 
dry, and finally culminates in the annual cycle. In the continuing emergence of the world, all of these correlated 
elements constituting the cosmos collaborate to produce each other and the totality.  
The Ancestral One, far from being a transcendent, ordering principle—a single source—that stands independent 
of the world it produces, is described as being coterminous with this world, is hidden within it, and circulates 
everywhere throughout it. While the Ancestral One gives birth to the waters, it also lies hidden in them, and these 
same waters collaterally assist it in giving birth to the heavens and the earth. This irreducible co laterality—water 
and Taiyi together producing the heavens and the heavens and Taiyi together producing the earth, and so on—has 
been emphasized by Li Ling, Pang Pu, and others in their interpretations of this textxi Pang Pu in explaining sheng 
⫳  makes a fundamental distinction between “paisheng ⌒⫳” in the sense of one thing giving birth to an 
independent existent, like a hen producing an egg, and “huasheng ࣪⫳” as one thing transforming into something 
else, like summer becoming autumn. He goes on to say: 
After taiyi gives birth to the waters, neither are the waters something external to taiyi nor taiyi to the waters. Taiyi 
is thus hidden away in the waters, and the waters are the continuity of the life of taiyi. 
In making this distinction, Pang Pu is alerting us to a further refinement in our understanding of the notion of 
“ancestor.” While we might be inclined to understand this progenitor/progeny relationship as a series in which there 
is an independence of the latter from the former, early Chinese cosmology on reflection clearly takes the progenitor 
as proliferating and living on in the progeny. 
Importantly, in this transformative process, time is inseparable from the emerging world. Indeed, time is the very 
propensity of the world to transform itself. And self-transformation is made possible by the penumbra of 
indeterminacy that always surrounds and qualifies dao as all that is (wanwu ϛ⠽). We shall see that dao, far from 
being understood as some ultimate, determinate One, is by virtue of this indeterminacy, one and many at the same 
time. In this cosmology, neither time nor relationality will be denied. 
Sarah Allan rehearses Zheng Xuan’s association between taiyi and the Pole Star. xii  Taiyi as the Pole Star 
constitutes the fixed centerpiece on what Steve Field has termed “the cosmograph (shi ᓣ),” a popular mantic board 
that provides the diviner with an idealized cosmology. Allan cites Chris Cullen who insists that this cosmograph is 
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“primarily concerned with the heavens as the source of a series of events ordered in time rather than as a spatially 
integrated whole.”xiii This means I think that any sense of the taiyi as “fixed” has to be qualified by its irrevocable 
relationality and temporality. For example, if we appeal as Allan does to the Analects 2.1 in our attempt to 
understand this kind of fixity, the point of this passage is not that the Pole Star is itself unmoving, but rather that in 
its relation to the other stars, it provides a relatively stationary bearing for their movement.xiv 
 This same point is also made when Confucius observes that “only the wisest and the most stupid do not move (yi 
⿏).”xv It is certainly not the case that the wisest do not continue to learn and grow—indeed, we have to remember 
that it is the wise that enjoy the vitality of water.xvi But relative to their community, those deemed the wisest serve as 
a regulative beacon and bearing for the conduct of others.  
In fact, taking this omnipresent correlativity one step further, we must appreciate the importance of the 
indeterminate, transformative aspect of dao. Daoist cosmogony does not entail the kind of radical initial beginning 
from a single source we associate with those metaphysical cosmogonies that describe the triumph of Order over 
Chaos. In fact, the Zhuangzi’s well-known account of the death of Lord Hundun ⏋≠—often translated 
unfortunately as Lord Chaos, but perhaps better rendered positively as Lord Spontaneity—provides a rather strong 
Daoist objection to such a “One-behind-the-many” reading: 
The ruler of the North Sea was “Swift,” the ruler of the South Sea was “Sudden,” and the ruler of the Center was 
“Hundun, or Spontaneity.” Lords Swift and Sudden had on several occasions encountered each other in the territory 
of Lord Spontaneity, and Spontaneity had treated them with great hospitality. Swift and Sudden, devising a way to 
repay Spontaneity’s generosity, remarked that: “Everyone has seven orifices through which they can see, hear, eat, 
and breathe. Spontaneity alone is without them.” They then attempted to bore holes in Spontaneity, each day boring 
one hole. On the seventh day, Spontaneity died.xvii  
But why according to the Zhuangzi should one not wish to bring order out of hundun?xviii A reasonable question, 
indeed, if hundun is the confusion and disarray—the formless surds—that other cosmogonies describe as primordial 
Chaos. But if on the contrary hundun is the integral indeterminacy necessary for the spontaneous emergence of 
novelty that honeycombs all construals of order in a continuing present, then the imposition of order upon it means 
the death of self-reconstrual and the novelty that attends it. After all, it is the collaboration of Spontaneity with Swift 
and Sudden that makes the life-experience deliciously uncertain and in degree, unpredictable. To enforce any given 
design—any particular teleology—is simply selecting one of a myriad candidates for order and privileging that one 
design over the rest. Swift and Sudden have to the world’s detriment transformed the unsummed and causally 
noncoherent dao into a single-ordered world. 
Instead of invoking the language of initial beginnings and some independent efficient cause, The Ancestral One 
Gives Birth to the Waters, in a way consistent with the Daodejing broadly with its pervasive mothering and birthing 
metaphors, describes natal beginnings in an ongoing cycle of autogenerative reproduction. Taiyi as “the mother (mu 
↡) of all things” is in one sense “female,” but neither “female” as opposed to “male” nor “mother” opposed to 
“offspring.” Instead, Taiyi is the impregnated and thus fecund female: the convergence of male and female described 
in Daodejing 28: “Know the male yet safeguard the female and be a river gorge to the world ⶹ݊䲘ᅜ݊䲠Ў໽ϟ
⑾.” And the child is the living continuation of the parents as implicated in the mother. It because of this natal 
sensibility that I have followed Sarah Allan’s suggestion that taiyi as dayi ໻ϔ entails a strong sense of progenitor, 
and have thus translated it as “the Ancestral One.” This genealogical cycle of reproduction is defined in terms of the 
mutuality of opposites: rising and then falling, advancing and then returning, waxing full and then waning empty. In 
this cycle, the workings of the world favor the transformation into new life as the process brings existing growth to 
culmination and closure.xix 
Where the account of these beginnings looks most like our own classical cosmogony is that the combination of 
temporality and the spontaneous emergence of novelty make any rational structures that we have available for 
naming or explaining experience always provisional, and eventually, obsolete. Process requires an ongoing 
reformulation of our terms of understanding. This point is made in strips 1013, a problematic passage that invokes a 
difference between “proper name (ming ৡ)” and “style name (zi ᄫ).” Like everyone else, I have my own reading 
of this probably corrupt passage, but on the basis of this familiar distinction between name as ming and zi, and as 
The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters explains, there is an important reason for why the “style name” dao is 
used rather than the more familiar “proper names” such as “soil” and “air.”  
According to The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters, we could just as well call these ongoing processes 
“soil and air,” or “the world,” or use other familiar names we have for describing the life-experience that goes on 
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around us. Such names are referential and specific, and communicate a communally shared meaning clearly. They 
are the names by means of which a determinate past lives on. But instead on occasion we follow the sages in using 
dao, a more tentative and even obscure “style name.” Why? 
A “style name” is self-selected, projective, and self-defining. Those sages who have been successful in the past 
have invoked this term dao in framing their own best efforts, and have associated their persons and their 
accomplishments with it. And those who would aspire to accord with dao as defined by the sages have no choice but 
to follow suit. They must proceed “in the name’ of dao”—a way of being in the world made articulate by these 
cultural heroes. Other language that is too familiar and well-established does not evoke the necessary sense of 
venturing beyond our known world that is required for creative advance. It is in this sense that dao does not have a 
proper name. With its attendant indeterminacy, it brings with it the assumption that we are trying with imagination 
to think outside the box. We are probing a realm beyond our present categories which as yet has no theoretical or 
conceptual limits. Thus, it is the very vagueness, indeterminacy, and openness of dao that recommends it as a term 
of art.  
How does this reading of The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters assist in clarifying classical Daoist 
cosmogony? Let’s apply what we learn from this document to an explanation of Daodejing 42. In fact, 
interpretations of passages in the classical Chinese canons like this one abound that either assume or ascribe 
explicitly a “One-source-behind-the-many” origin to the cosmos, construing it as a rather clear case of our familiar 
creatio ex nihilo cosmogony. Daodejing 42 states:  
 
Dao engenders one, 
One, two, 
Two, three, 
And three, the myriad things. 
 
I would suggest that any purely cosmogonic interpretation of this passage that offends against its process 
sensibility is impoverishing of its profundity. We must begin from Whitehead calls “the Ontological principle:—the 
notion of an ontological parity of finitude that give all things an equal claim on being real—what we might 
alternatively term “a realistic pluralism.”xx This principle is an affirmation of the reality of any thing as it is 
constituted by the harmony of its constitutive relations, whether it be each and every thing, each and every kind of 
thing, or the unsummed totality of things. This assumption then provides at least three different perspectives from 
which this passage can be read. 
Synchronically this passage can be understood particularistically as a polysemous way of looking at and 
describing each of the unique and persistent events (wanwu) that are occurring in a continuing present. 
Diachronically, the passage can also be read as a way of looking at any persistent category or species as a general 
kind of thing—humankind, for example—moves toward consummation and dispersal. And Daodejing 42 can also 
be read holistically as a description of the consummatory, phasal progress of the totality in which all things 
participate over their careers. I want to insist that all of these descriptions are necessarily entertained from a 
perspective internal to the process itself, and thus entail creatio in situ rather than ex nihilo sensibilities.  
One way of justifying a creatio in situ reading of the unique and persistent particular is to appeal to what Tang 
Junyi takes as a generic feature of the Chinese processual cosmology:xxi “the inseparability of the one and the many, 
of uniqueness and multivalence, of continuity and multiplicity, of integrity and integration (yiduo bufenguan ϔ໮ϡ
ߚ㾖).”xxii What Tang Junyi means by this expression is that if we begin our reflection on the emergence of cosmic 
order from the wholeness of lived experience, we can view this experience in terms of both its dynamic continuities 
and its manifold multiplicity, as both a procesual flow and as distinct consummatory events. It is one more example 
of the mutual implication of opposites that characterizes all phenomena in the natural world—in this case, 
particularity and the totality. That is, any particular phenomenon in our field of experience can be focused in as 
many different ways: on the one hand it is a unique and persistent particular, and on the other, it has the entire 
cosmos and all that is happening implicated within its own particular pattern of relationships. To capture this 
cosmological insight we might translate this same Daodejing passage as: 
 
Way-making (dao) gives rise to the notions of continuity and  
determinacy, 
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Continuity and determinacy give rise to the notions of difference 
and contrast, 
Difference and contrast give rise to the notion of plurality, 
And plurality gives rise to the notion of a proliferation of everything 
that is happening (wanwu).  
 
Key to this passage is the priority of dao to the very ambiguous notion of “one”—which means at once the 
disjunction of determinacy and continuity. Persons, for example, are “one” both in their unique individuality and in 
the unbroken continuity they have with their environing others, and yet they are a divided and sometimes conflicted 
“multiplicity” in the field of selves through which their many personas are manifested: someone’s parent and 
someone else’s child, someone’s colleague and someone’s else’s adversary, someone’s teacher and someone else’s 
lover, someone’s benefactor and someone else’s judge. And the entire field of experience with all of its plurality is 
focused uniquely as it is construed from each particular perspective. It is this complex nature of relatedness—at once 
one and many—that is expressed in this passage when it is read “cosmologically.” It gives an account of the generic 
features of how things hang together in lived experience rather than providing a derivative “One-behind-the-many” 
cosmogony. 
But cosmogony albeit of a creatio in situ kind also has a role in this cosmological reading. First, from the 
perspective of any particular thing or any particular kind of thing, the process is punctuated and consummatory. We 
each individually live the seasons of our lives. And as a species, in the fullness of time, as the spontaneous 
emergence of novelty in a continuing present overwhelms any rational strategies we might have for understanding 
and explaining the process, the past becomes increasingly indeterminate, taking on the amorphous character that we 
have generally associated with accounts of initial beginnings. Here, however, such indeterminacy is not revealing of 
initial beginnings, but rather of the limitations of our interpretive categories. In the emergence of the human 
experience, there is a fluidity among the animal, the human, and the inspired cultural hero—the sage—who over 
time challenges the very meaning of what it is to be human.  
Further, the emergent totality itself as a particular observed from within the process is also of a phasal and 
consummatory nature, moving forward like the four seasons from the inchoate stirrings in the undifferentiated 
darkness of winter to the burgeoning profusion of spring to the golden ripeness of autumn, then retreating back 
again into a seemingly hibernating suspension of determinacy, only to begin again. Significantly, the account of The 
Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters giving birth to the world concludes with the culminating of the yearly cycle. 
Rather than a doctrine of initial beginnings, dao is a never-ending story of cosmic cycles in which living 
“beginnings” express the potent energy of transformation that emerges from within. As suggested above, the 
language of beginning is natal, as is reflected in the notion shi ྟ, comprised as it is of woman and womb, or even 
explicitly as fecund mother (mu ↡)xxiii  and inseminating sire (fu ⠊).xxiv Beginnings are articulatory with chu ߱, 
denoting the cutting and styling of clothes as they are tailored and emerge out of whole cloth, or are organic, as in 
the sheng ⫳ of shengsheng buxi ⫳⫳ϡᙃ , meaning not only “birth” but irrepressible “life” and “growth.” 
Beginnings are not discrete “organs” perse, but situated beginnings that produce meaning out of the proliferation of 
consummating particulars and by the productive relationships that are entailed by this increased differentiation.  
The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters—particularly in its exposition on dao—provides us with an insight 
into how “creativity” is expressed in the Chinese philosophical vocabulary. I would suggest that “creativity” 
parallels “rhetoric” in both its importance and in its paronomasic mode of expression in the Chinese language. That 
is, the fact that the rhetorical and the philosophical are not dichotomized in the Chinese tradition has led some 
scholars to claim that China does not have a rhetorical tradition—a theme that has been so prominent within our 
own cultural narrative. At the same time, it has led others such as Carine Defoort to argue for a reconsideration of 
the power of language itself.xxv Indeed, a persistent theme in the Chinese philosophical corpus that gives the claim 
that there is no rhetorical tradition the lie, is the assumed “ontology” of language itself—a sustained exhortation that 
language must be constantly adjusted (zhengming ℷৡ) and used circumspectly because the way we “name (ming 
ৡ)” things “commands (ming ੑ)” a world into being. The fertility of language like the fertility of dao lies in the 
indeterminacy that allows for ars contextualis: the art of recontextualizing. Zhengming—properly understood as 
paronomasia rather than as “the rectification of names”—is the ongoing redefining of our terms of explanation 
through semantic and phonetic associations.  
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In our recent translation of the Zhongyong, David Hall and I have audaciously made explicit what the 
commentarial tradition on this text suggests in arguing that cheng 䆮 in certain contexts can be appropriately parsed 
as “creativity.”xxvi Not only cheng, but the gerundive language that is used to describe the unfolding of the human 
narrative generally has this creative dimension. Dao 䘧, for example, is not only simply the “way,” but is “way-
making (dao ᇐ).” As the Zhuangzi says so elegantly, “The way is made in the walking 䘧 㸠 П 㗠 ៤.”xxvii 
How are these features of Daoist cosmology, then, specifically relevant to the Confucian sensibilities? As we can 
see, the Confucian philosophical vocabulary also entails a sense of creativity that can be described in terms of 
particularity, temporality, collateral relationality, and productive indeterminacy. In Pang Pu’s first run at The 
Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters, he cites a passage from the Book of Ritual Propriety as the basis for the 
claim that there is an explicit relationship between dayi or taiyi as described in The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the 
Waters and the key Confucian notion of ritual propriety (li ⼐): 
 
ᰃᬙ໿⼐ˈᖙᴀѢ໻ϔˈߚ㗠Ў໽ഄˈ 䕀㗠Ў䰈䰇ˈ ব㗠Ўಯᯊˈ ߫㗠Ў儐⼲Ǆ 
Hence, as for ritual propriety, it certainly has its roots in the Ancestral One. Dividing, it becomes the heavens and the earth, 
turning it becomes yin and yang, changing it becomes the four seasons, separating it becomes the ghosts and spirits.xxviii 
 
And as we learn from the Analects 1.12, ⼐П⫼ˈ ੠Ў䌉 “achieving harmony is the most valuable function of 
observing ritual propriety.” Here I would like to focus on the creative dimension this other key term in the Zisizi 
vocabulary, harmony (he ੠), and argue that the same features of particularity, temporality, collateral relationality, 
and productive indeterminacy are also defining characteristics of this idea when found in a Confucian context. 
Let’s begin with particularity. A.N. Whitehead identifies the more pernicious forms of what Dewey has called the 
philosophical fallacy with taking the formally abstracted to be what is real and concrete. In this guise, he describes 
the philosophical fallacy as the fallacy of “misplaced concreteness.”xxix Whitehead rehearses the history of this “fatal 
virus” that has compromised our understanding of the intrinsic, constitutive, and productive nature of relatedness. 
He accuses Epicurus, Plato, and Aristotle as being “unaware of the perils of abstraction” that render knowledge 
closed and complete. According to Whitehead, “the history of thought” that he associates with these great men. 
 
... is a tragic mixture of vibrant disclosure and of deadening closure. The sense of penetration is lost in the certainty of 
completed knowledge. This dogmatism is the antichrist of learning. In the full concrete connection of things, the characters of the 
things connected enter into the character of the connectivity which joins them.xxx  
 
What Whitehead means by “the sense of penetration” is productive continuity and creative advance: the 
spontaneous emergence of novelty in a continuing present. He uses “friendship” as an example of a relationship that 
is constituted by the characters of the two persons involved, where the continuity of a real meaningful friendship is a 
matter of vibrant disclosure in which two persons “appreciate” each other in the most literal sense of this term. 
Importantly, the realization of this vital relationship is not at the expense of their personal uniqueness and integrity, 
but indeed a consequence of it. Integrity means both the persistent particularity of each friend, and the becoming one 
together that is both the substance of real friendship and a source of cosmic meaning. This relationship is what 
Whitehead means by “aesthetic” in the sense that it is the disclosure of the particular details in the totality of the 
effect.  
Whitehead again criticizes the classical Greek tradition for losing sight of the balance needed between the 
particular details and the achieved harmony.  
 
The enjoyment of Greek art is always haunted by a longing for the details to exhibit some rugged independence apart from 
the oppressive harmony. In the greatest examples of any form of art, a miraculous balance is achieved. The whole displays its 
component parts, each with its own value enhanced; and the parts lead up to a whole, which is beyond themselves, yet not 
destructive of themselves.xxxi 
 
When applied to the human experience, disclosure in our relationships is what makes them meaningful, or said 
more dynamically, is what makes them a situated case of meaning making. Any understanding of harmony that 
emphasizes conformity at the expense of disclosing particularity precludes the possibility of the spontaneous 
emergence of novelty in the continuing present and is thus life-threatening. As Whitehead observes, 
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Our lives are passed in the experience of disclosure. As we lose this sense of disclosure, we are shedding that mode of 
functioning which is the soul. We are descending to mere conformity with the average of the past. Complete conformity means 
the loss of life. There remains the barren existence of inorganic nature.xxxii 
 
The point that Whitehead is making here is that productive harmony is always going to be collateral rather than 
unilateral, correlative rather than univocal, concrete and situated rather than abstract, a case of disclosure rather than 
closure. The only kind of creativity is co-creativity. 
It is indeed this sense of productive harmony as co-creativity that is being advanced in the Guodian texts. In Five 
Modes of Proper Conduct, the cultivation of one’s own character in community as virtuosic habits of the heart and 
mind expressed in one’s conduct is described as harmony: 
 
Authoritativeness (ren ҕ) taking shape within is called the forming of character (de ᖋ);xxxiii where it does not take shape 
within it is simply called proper conduct. Appropriateness (yi Н) taking shape within is called the forming of character; where it 
does not take shape within it is simply called proper conduct. Observing ritual propriety (li ⼐) taking shape within is called the 
forming of character; where it does not take shape within it is simply called proper conduct.xxxiv Wisdom (zhi ⶹ) taking shape 
within is called the forming of character; where it does not take shape within it is simply called proper conduct. Sagacity (sheng
೷) taking shape within is called the forming of character; where it does not take shape within it is simply called proper 
conduct.xxxv There are five ways of forming of character, where harmony (he ੠) among them is called character. Harmony 
among the four kinds of conduct is called felicity (shan ୘). Felicity is the human way (rendao Ҏ䘧); character is the way of tian 
(tiandao ໽䘧).xxxvi 
  
And as described in the first passage of the Zhongyong, this attainment of human character has cosmic implications: 
 
The moment at which joy and anger, grief and pleasure, have yet to arise is called a nascent equilibrium (zhong Ё); once the 
emotions have arisen, that they are all brought into proper focus (zhong) is called harmony (he ੠). This notion of equilibrium 
and focus (zhong) is the great root of the world; harmony then is the advancing of the proper way (dadao 䖒䘧) in the world.xxxvii 
When equilibrium and focus are sustained and harmony is fully realized, the heavens and earth maintain their proper places and 
all things flourish in the world. 
 
This radically situated co-creative process is described explicitly in the Zhongyong 25 proposition: 
 
Creativity (cheng 䆮) is self-consummating (zicheng 㞾៤), and its way (dao 䘧) is self-advancing (zidao 㞾䘧). Creativity 
references a process (wu⠽) taken from its beginning to its end, and without this creativity, there are no things or events. It is 
thus that, for exemplary persons (junzi ৯ᄤ), it is creativity that is prized. But creativity is not simply the self-consummating of 
one’s own person; it is also what consummates other things and events. Consummating oneself is becoming authoritative in one’s 
conduct (ren ҕ); while consummating other things and events is realizing the world (zhi ⶹ). It is achieved excellence (de ᖋ) in 
one’s natural tendencies (xing ᗻ) and is the way of integrating what is more internal and what is more external. Thus, when and 
wherever one applies such excellence, it is fitting.  
 
This sense of radically situated creativity is lost when we understand sheng ⫳ as simply “birth” rather than “birth, 
growth, life,” and when we understand xing ᗻ as simply “natural endowment” rather than initial conditions together 
with what Angus Graham describes as the “spontaneous process with the direction continually modified by the 
effects on it of deliberate action.”xxxviii 
A consideration of harmony as this radically situated process of co-creativity establishes a sharp contrast with 
assumptions about the familiar creatio ex nihilo source of meaning. What is it about this creatio ex nihilo model of 
creativity that makes it inappropriate for interpreting both classical Chinese cosmology and the Confucian notion of 
harmony? Firstly, ex nihilo is dependent upon discrete agency, distinguishing creator and creature. But in the 
processual qi cosmology of China, situation is always prior to agency, so that creator and creature are mutually 
implicated and continuous. Individuals as discrete agents are a conceptual abstraction from their concrete, 
constitutive relationships. Creativity is radically situated, where creativity and self-creativity are inseparable. It is 
this collateral nature of creativity that Hellmut Wilhelm was remarking upon when he observed that “the division of 
the creative process into two aspects is an idea frequently found in early Chinese writings.”xxxix Since creativity is 
thus resolutely transactional, it always entails responsibility. We will find that effective communication is the chief 
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means of sustaining and reconstituting the flourishing human community, and an intimate communion with nature 
the chief means of inhabiting a world with sensitivity and receptivity.  
Secondly, ex nihilo focuses on originality as its source of value. In situ creativity on the other hand emphasizes 
enhanced significance over originality and novelty. Relationships that appreciate in meaning are the source of 
creativity as increased significance. In situ creativity is prospective in that it focuses on the ongoing productivity of 
its applications in the continuing present rather than on its origins as its source of value. In fact, to the extent that 
creativity would be limited to an isolated and independent agent, it would quickly wither in its meaningfulness. As 
Herb Fingarette has said rather succinctly, “For Confucius, unless there are at least two human beings, there can be 
no human beings.”xl  
Thirdly, ex nihilo is the bringing of “nothing” novel into existence in the sense that whatever creature is produced 
stands in absolute dependence upon its creative source. Creatio in situ on the other hand is the growth of the 
dynamic relationships that constitute things through the art of contextualization (ars contextualis), with the 
continuing emergence of something new and meaningful in those relations. It is thus that the vocabulary of personal 
excellence (de ᖋ) in Chinese philosophy is defined paronomastically as “getting (de ᕫ),” “spirituality (shen ⼲)” is 
“stretching and extending (shen Ԍ),” becoming human (ren Ҏ) is to become “human together (ren ҕ), and so on.  
Fourthly, the ex nihilo model appeals to a source of novelty that denies history, development, and process. 
Scholars who talk this language evoke notions such as the “eternality” and “timelessness” of a non-temporal source 
of genesis. Such an appeal locates us outside of empirical experience and is in fact meaningless in the Chinese 
transformative cosmology. In situ creativity, on the other hand, is the very substance of history, development, and 
consummatory disclosure. In this model, in the language of William James, relations, transitions, and conjunctions 
are all real.xli And as noted above, the dynamic nature of experience requires appeal to the consequences of action as 
well as its antecedents, and its possibilities as well as its precedents. It is this forward propensity of experience that 
makes it consummatory. This in situ conception of creativity accounts for both cumulative products of particular 
experience (a kind of situational causality), and spontaneous variations that survive because of their consequent 
efficacy. 
Finally, ex nihilo creativity appeals to a nihil or void beyond the wholeness of experience, whereas in situ 
creativity is wholly empirical, entailing the indeterminate “nothing (wu ᮴)” as the constant correlate of the 
determinate “something (yu ᳝)” that together constitute an explanatory rather than ontological vocabulary for 
describing the ongoing process of experience. Whilst creativity is the spontaneous emergence of novelty in a 
continuing present, such emergence out of indeterminacy is radically contextualized. There is no notion of “void” 
but only a fecund receptivity in a tradition in which all beginnings are fetal beginnings (shi ྟ).xlii 
Thus it is that understanding Daoist cosmology as entailing particularity, temporality, collateral relationality, and 
productive indeterminacy provides us with a language for understanding more clearly the Confucian sense of 
harmony (he) as creatio in situ. 
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ǏAssessmentǐ 





It seems to me that Confucianism has two sets of terminology. One set is composed of ethical terms, such as 
character, humanity, rightness, propriety, wisdom, and sagacity; the other set comprises the terminology of 
cosmogony, such as living, creativity, Way, transformation, and so on. For those who are used to interpreting 
Confucianism from ethical perspectives, the latter is considered merely as an extension of the former. Alternatively, 
they take cosmogony as a justification for morals in the sense of Kantian Moral Metaphysics.  
Roger Ames’s paper gives us a new understanding on this matter. Starting from the newly found Guodian strips, 
and focusing on the text “The Ancestral One Gives Birth to the Waters”, he identifies a striking feature of classical 
Chinese cosmogony- creatio in situ. Although this feature can also be seen in the Confucian classics-mainly in The 
Doctrine of Mean, texts of Laozi and Zhuangzi, and the Commentaries of the Yijing that has been noted by some 
scholars-Roger makes a new contribution to a broader understanding of this characteristic, relating it to an 
interpretation of some key terms, such as Harmony, Living, Creativity, the origin and the meaning of Confucian 
ethics. 
Four points are worth noting. 
Firstly, the classical Chinese cosmogony existed before the formation of Confucianism and Daoism. The fact that 
both schools preserved those older ideas explains why they are similar and overlap each other in cosmogony. It 
seems there is no reason to argue for which school first produced the cosmogony.  
Secondly, the cosmogony of Daoism has usually been interpreted as a kind of metaphysics, and seen as the 
cornerstone of Daoism. By contrast, its place in Confucianism has been overlooked, being seen either as marginal, 
or as auxiliary. Ames invites us to pay attention to the original relationship between cosmogony and Confucian 
ethics, and to realize that the significance of cosmogony in Confucianism is no less than in Daoism. 
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Thirdly, with the help of Dewey’s criticism of “the philosophical fallacy”, Ames explains the necessity of 
applying Darwinism to the inquiry into the origin of philosophical ideas. Confucian ethical ideas were not ready-
made, or personally produced by sages. Rather, they resulted from the conduct of ancient peoples, and the way they 
adapted to the circumstances. The adapted conduct consisted in reactions to empirical circumstances. When they 
were able to write, they wrote down the circumstances of their ancestor’s life experiences in the form of a 
cosmogony. It is understandable how a picture of cosmogony fits into the Darwinian evolutionism. In order to 
understand further about the origin of ethics, we need to understand not only how ancient peoples adapted to the 
world, but also what they knew about it. It is in this sense that ethics is relevant to cosmogony. 
Fourthly, Ames captures the difference between Chinese and Western cosmogony by the contrast between 
creatio in situ and creatio ex nihilo. Using the comparative approach, he answers questions as why the Chinese had 
neither the idea of God the Creator, nor transcendentalism and its dualistic categories. These questions have been 
discussed ardently. Ames’s vision of cosmogony opens up a new perspective of interpretation. In the face of the 
contrast between Eastern and Western philosophical narratives, he evaluates the Eastern vision and criticizes the 
Western tradition. From critiques of Dewey and Whitehead, he draws lessons from Eastern thinking as a remedy for 
Western transcendentalism.  
II 
If one can assume a sincere attitude in dialogue, it may result in one possibly finding out that the “other side” 
possesses more advantages than one’s own, and that one’s own side has more disadvantages than the other party. 
Ames’s paper embodies such attitude. As a dialogist on the Chinese side, I have to adopt the same attitude toward 
Western and Eastern thinking. 
As the origin of Western thinking, the early Greeks did not lack the idea of creation in situ. Hesiod’s Theogony 
stated that cosmos originated from Chaos. Orpheus thought that myriad things came from the Egg. The early Greek 
philosophers inherited the mythology of cosmogony, but substituted the Physis for the Arche of the gods. Thales the 
first philosopher attributes the Arche to Water that is equal to the divine force and comparable to the “Ancestral 
One” as seen in the Guodian strips. His pupil Anaximander thought that all things came from and returned to the 
apeiron (indefinite), which reminds us of the Zhuangzi’s fable of Chaos. Anaximine worked out a theory of Air 
similar to the Eastern one. Unfortunately, the fragments of those philosophers are so fragmentary that we are unable 
to compare them in detail with the theories of Eastern philosophers. Fortunately, Heraclites left rather more 
fragments, which allows us to see many ideas similar to Laozi’s. Heraclites’ Logos can be identified with Laozi’s 
Way. Both work in the ceaseless process of production and transformation. Everything transforms in the world. 
Wisdom (Logos or Way) consists in the grasp of the proper time and degrees of change. 
Not until Parmenides was the cosmogony of gignesthai (be-coming, coming to be) replaced by the metaphysics 
of eon (being, to be). Through the efforts of Plato and Aristotle, metaphysics was established as the mainstream of 
Western thought, and Logos was posited as the logical principle for rational thinking by which pairs of opposite 
concepts could be isolated one by one. Even then the idea of creatio ex nihilo was not found in Greek thinking. That 
idea was introduced into Christianity from the Hebrews. The God as Creator combined with the Metaphysics of 
Being to mark the birth of a transcendental absolutism which controls the structure of the world and social hierarchy.  
Just because Westerners criticize their own traditional mentality and look for some supplement from Eastern 
ways of thinking should not encourage we Chinese from arrogantly entrusting our hopes for the future to narcissism 
for the ancient tradition. We have to recognize the historical necessity and reasonableness of the transition from 
creatio in situ to creatio ex nihilo, acknowledging that the latter is internal to the advantage of the Western culture 
and the superiority of modern science. 
First, the metaphysical tradition as presented by Plato and Aristotle assumed that changing phenomena are not 
certain, and cannot be the subject-matter of knowledge. Only the unchangeable essence and substance (Being) can 
be known with certainty and measured by rational means. Metaphysics of Being, logic, and the quest for certainty 
are intrinsic to episteme. Some elements were eliminated through the historical process akin to natural selection for 
species, while others evolved into the modern science. 
Secondly, according to the Genesis of creatio ex nihilo, man and nature are independent and equal before the 
Creator. Humans are stewards of Nature, yet without absolute dominance over it. On the other hand, Nature has no 
human attributes. According to Max Weber, modern rationality is characterized by disenchantment. The 
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disenchantment of Nature aims at separating it from divinity and humanity. Without the separation, man cannot 
objectively observe and scientifically study natural phenomena. 
The above two advantages of Western knowledge are wanting in the Eastern tradition. The ancient Chinese were 
satisfied with the cosmology of the ceaseless, continuing process, and found no need to pursue certainty (both 
certain subject-matter and a definite method of thinking). Strict ways of logical thinking and systematic knowledge 
of mathematics and experimentation did not exist due to lack of interest and need, rather than of intelligent capacity. 
Cosmology of creation in situ resulted in a world view and valorization of the human experience under the title of 
the unity of Heaven and the human. Both the Human Way and the Heavenly Way, Man and Nature were combined 
into an inseparable organism, in which cosmos was imbued with ethical character, and human society obeyed the 
natural order. Under the governance of such a mentality human beings could hardly do objective research on nature, 
just as one can hardly do surgery on one’s own body. 
Feng Youlan many years ago published an article entitled “Why did China have no science?” He distinguished 
between the “natural way” and the “artificial way.” The former was represented by Mencius and Daoism, and 
demanded the realization of Dao or Reason bestowed by nature on the human mind. The latter was represented by 
Xunzi and Mohism, and demanded the obtaining of benefits from nature by conquering nature with human force. 
Feng said that the “artificial way” had been almost extinguished in China after the Qin Dynasty, and that Buddhism, 
introduced into China during the Han dynasty, had an extreme form of the “natural way.” The natural way of the 
three mainstreams-Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism-hindered the development of science in China.  
In the West, on the contrary, the “artificial way” was followed from ancient through middle to modern ages 
without discontinuity. European science “has gradually continued through history, without an obvious dividing line 
between medieval and modern Europe”. In my opinion, the “artificial way” consists in the dichotomy of man and 
nature, while the “natural way” is their unity. The reason why the latter had been the mainstream for Chinese 
thinking can be answered by referring to the persistence of creatio in situ in the ancient thinking. On the other side, 
due to the transition from creatio in situ to creatio ex nihilo, the “artificial way” dominated in the West.  
III 
The methodology embodied in Ames’s paper is very attractive to me. Any inquiry into origins is necessarily 
incomplete in knowledge and evidence. New findings and new corrections are always required at certain moments. 
Knowing under a reliable method is more important than extant knowledge. Ames proposes evolutionism and 
pragmatism, and shares Dewey’s genetic method. Dewey’s study of the origins of logic, ethics, science, and 
philosophy is a masterwork for the unity of Darwinism and Pragmatism. When Hu Shi first introduced Dewey’s 
thought into China, he appreciated the genetic or historical method in particular, and evaluated its use in his studies 
of Eastern culture. 
Ames notices the danger of the philosophical study of arche: it is the “anachronism that reads history narrowly 
backwards from a given theoretical construct, finding the origins of an historical narrative what in fact is merely one 
of the reflective fruits of that narrative.” If we interpret the genesis of ancient ideas according to later classics or any 
particular “-ism,” the danger of anachronism cannot be avoided. To meet the challenge, we must use more primitive 
materials to interpret ideas in later times. 
Daniel Dennett, in his Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, distinguished between two sorts of methods: “skyhook” (from 
up to down) and “crane” (from down to up). Ames selects the Guodian strips as his crane, from primitive 
cosmogony up to advanced ideas of ethics. His choice fits Dewey’s genetic method. Needless to say, the genetic 
study of Eastern thinking is just beginning. The Darwinian “crane” will be located on broader and firmer ground if 
archaeological findings, anthropological investigations, and pre-historical legends can offer more evidence about the 
natural, social, and cultural conditions that informed intellectual life in the pre-historical period. 
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Remarks on Roger Ames’ Paper: Cultural Tactics and the Future of 
China 
Li Silong 
Professor, Department of Philosophy, Peking University 
Using a plain style, Professor Lou’s essay tells us about the function and significance of “cultural subjective 
consciousness” in cultural exchanges. In his essay, Professor Lou makes a thought-provoking assertion about a 
recent phenomenon in China: “The foundation of Chinese culture is becoming less and less substantial. Because of 
the absence of traditional culture in basic education and the pervasion of Western culture in mass media, the 
understanding about traditional culture is being weakened from generation to generation.”  
The main body of this essay, which deals with “learning from the West in order to develop national culture,” was 
written in 1990 to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Opium War. Today, nearly fifteen years later, this 
essay seems to have even more contemporary significance. As the subjective consciousness of Chinese culture has 
become more and more deeply submerged in the flood of globalization, with the yell of such unilateral slogans like 
“Join the world,” “Internationalization,” or “World-class,” the ghost of “wholesale Westernization” wanders just 
like before, or perhaps with  changed appearance.  
The process of reform and opening up has made our country become a great nation in politics and economy; 
meanwhile, however, in regard to its culture, today’s China is shrinking to a minor nation. It seems we at heart wish 
to regularize, or control everything around us with Western standards. This condition can be described with a saying: 
“We have gradually lost our bearings.” We cannot help but ask: As Chinese, what shall we still defend?  
Formerly we worried about the ability of China to join the world community because of our poverty and 
backwardness. Today, with our rising political and economical status, this is no longer something we worry about; 
however, there are more and more Chinese who don’t care about keeping their “national characteristics.” The 
problem has become more and more serious, and just adding some money or a few missiles cannot resolve it. In my 
opinion, the cause lies in the fact that we are gradually abandoning our “cultural subjective consciousness, hence in 
culture, it has become more and more difficult to be identified as a “Chinese.” 
Professor Lou has studied in great depth some modern intellectuals like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. His 
essay looks back on the struggle between Chinese and Western cultures, from Kang and Liang onwards to the 1930s 
and 1940s, spanning some generations. Those so-called “conservative” intellectuals lived during China’s hard times, 
when the whole country was full of the fervor for learning from the West, and “cultural reactionism” was so 
disdained that “it \[was\] a needless waste of time arguing with them.” It goes without saying that it was very 
difficult to develop Chinese culture in such an environment.  
Now that our national power is becoming increasingly stronger, and nationalistic emotion is increasingly rising, it 
seems it should be easier to persuade our fellow citizens to cherish our cultural traditions, but in fact it is not. Unlike 
half a century ago, our daily life is nearly completely controlled by Western culture, and following a traditional 
lifestyle has become almost a luxury, which is viewed as valuable only as an antique. And when critics reflect upon 
certain so-called “national faults,” they attribute all ill things in daily life to “tradition,” and ascribe everything they 
like to the West.  
Why should we hold on to the subjective consciousness of Chinese culture and develop traditional culture? It is 
surely not for returning to the ancients, or retaining what is out of date. In his essay, Professor Lou proposes two 
reasons: one is the need for cultural exchanges; in his words, “cultural exchanges presuppose the peaceful 
coexistence of plural cultures, and if world cultures all develop toward one single end, it is neither possible nor 
necessary to have exchanges.” “It is possible to absorb elements of other cultures to nourish and enrich one’s own 
culture rationally and pertinently, to strengthen it gradually, so long as individuals stick to the subjectivity of their 
own culture.” In fact, “to maintain and develop plural cultures, especially their own” is also one of the purposes of 
cultural exchanges. The other reason is the need for patriotic education—“how is it possible to love a country or a 
nation without recognizing the traditional culture as its embodiment?” 
Under the present circumstances, Professor Lou’s proposal of “the subjectivity of Chinese culture” is a very 
important one. In my opinion, there are at least three advantages for establishing solid “cultural subjective 
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consciousness”: first, it helps to critically inherit our own cultural tradition without drastic political turbulence; 
second, it helps to form effective global cultural tactics and establish an attractive image of China to the world; third, 
it also helps to gestate a healthy cultural mood, and in the position of ordinary citizens, especially of intellectuals, 
we should make great efforts to shape the cultural mood of a great Eastern country.  
The first goal “to critically inherit our own cultural tradition” has been a long-term claim common to generations 
of leaders since Mao Zedong, but in actual practice, we always seem to criticize too much and inherit too little. 
Especially the cultural continuity damaged  by the Cultural Revolution is very difficult to restore. Generally 
speaking, the cultural mode-change takes place very slowly if there is no drastic political turbulence, and some 
historians even propose “longue dur e” to study changes of society. Therefore, solid “cultural subjective 
consciousness” can offer us a “backbone,” so can we know how to critically inherit our traditional culture, avoid the 
strong influence of political ideology, harmonize national political life, and forestall destructive political changes 
and military operations.  
The second goal emphasizes the relationship between China and the world. Solid “cultural subjective 
consciousness” helps to constitute a series of global cultural tactics, which can make Chinese culture better known 
to the world. The globalization of the economy, the internationalization of politics, the cosmopolitanization of 
culture—they are all weakening and eroding the cultural traditions of countries and nations. For example, American 
culture is the strongest culture in contemporary world. From Coca Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken in daily life, to 
Boeing airplanes over our heads, all are prevailing in China, and it seems to be impossible to change this situation.  
Why does it take place? The backwardness of technology is only a superficial explanation, and the root is still in 
culture. Taking city planning and architecture for an example, there are skyscrapers in every metropolis all over the 
world, but in N.Y. or Chicago, viewing various skyscrapers, you would sincerely feel that in the U.S., the skyscraper 
is in fact a cultural tradition. But in Peking, you can also find many skyscrapers: most old ones are boring and bald 
blocks, and the new ones are frequently grotesque. The Olympic Gymnasium looks like a nest, and the Great 
National Theatre, steamed bread. But they are in fashion. The disorder of Peking’s city planning reflects the extreme 
lack of “cultural subjective consciousness.” The Olympic Gymnasium and the Great National Theatre were 
originally built to show the beauty of China to the world, but in effect what is shown has nothing to do with what is 
Chinese.  
The third goal aims at the contemporary cultural mood in China. China is not only a regional power, but will also 
become a world power, which is destined by its population and accelerated by economic reform. But the cultural 
mood in contemporary China is not normal: either there is narrow arrogant nationalism in the public’s hatred of 
Japan and the U.S., or the blind cynical cosmopolitanism in admiration of the West. We just can’t keep a balance 
between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Many Chinese on the one hand often talk about the long history of 
Chinese culture, yet on the other hand, they imitate the West everywhere because of the country’s poverty and 
backwardness, and, intentionally or unconsciously, view their country as being secondary in culture, even as a 
“cultural colony.” For example, today’s undergraduates are the most patriotic group in the entire country, and they 
hate the political, economical, military, and cultural hegemony of the U.S. deeply; but, at the same time, they are 
among the most fanatical fans of the U.S. of the entire world, and many of them try hard to go to the U.S. every year. 
They at heart condemn the backwardness of culture and education in China. The only method we can use to resolve 
this problem is for our universities to imitate universities in the U.S. as closely as possible, to try to produce our 
bachelors, masters, and doctors in an American way. But I think it is an erroneous path for college education, for it 
weakens our cultural subjectivity further and strengthens our status as a minor country in culture, and is not the way 
to shape our own mode of education. The more thorough the Americanization of Chinese college education is, the 
more unbalanced the Chinese cultural mood will be. We blindly follow the various standards made by the U.S.; even 
if we could catch up with them one day, what would we do if they changed the standards tomorrow? Consequently, 
we must have our own standards and modes that conform to China’s condition.  
In my opinion, a sound cultural mood should both conserve the traditional culture and assimilate excellent 
aspects of foreign cultures; it should neither worship nor repel world powers, neither belittle nor disregard our minor 
neighbors, and neither forget past humiliations nor still be full of hatred against the aggressor countries of past 
history. As contemporary intellectuals, we should establish a cultural mood for the peaceful rise of our country, and 
we should have an open-minded approach to contribute wisdom and civilization to the common prosperity of the 
whole world.  
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In the first place, it demands of us that we have a subjective consciousness of Chinese culture. Just think: is it 
possible for a person who does not cherish his own cultural tradition at all, to identify with other traditions sincerely? 
If the identification with others does not rest upon the foundation of self-identification and is without its own 
subjectivity, but is out of a utilitarian and pragmatic mood, then when these people are weak in power, they would 
imitate others teeth and nail, which is an error of “(national) cultural nihilism.” When they feel that they are strong 
enough, they would command others to obey them, which is an error of “(national) cultural imperialism.” These 
errors can be found in Japan’s “Pan-Eastern Asia Circle of Co-prosperity” in history, and the United States’ “Iraq 
War” in the present day.  
Professor Lou’s essay tells us the main direction and principle in plain language; but if we still have time, we 
would like Professor Lou to tell us in more detail: how could the subjectivity of Chinese culture be embodied under 
the present circumstances? And what is the concrete meaning of such subjectivity?  
(Trans. by Li Jun) 
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